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CHAPTER 1 
Microfinance in India: Lessons from the 
Andhra Crisis* 
Vijay Mahajan** and T. Navin*** 
1 The Two-Model Microfinance Industry in India 
The Indian economy was able to witness high levels of economic growth follow-
ing the economic reforms that were introduced in the 1990s. The GDP grew at the 
rate of 8.45 % per annum between the years 2004 till 20111. Despite this, India 
continued to see high degree of poverty and low human development. While 
growth did create zones of prosperity, and reduce poverty and hunger, the residue 
was still very large – 37.2 % of the Indian population continued to be poor2, while 
77 % of the population remained vulnerable to income shocks3. This proportion 
was even higher for the socially disadvantaged groups such as the Scheduled 
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and Minorities. India continued to occupy a low rank 
– 134 – in the UNDP Human Development Index which takes into account health, 
education, income, inequality, poverty, gender, sustainability and demographic 
indicators4. With an estimated 385 million employed population, unemployment 
in India was estimated to be about 9.4 %. 5 
The post independent Indian state adopted various means for addressing poverty 
and livelihood challenges. This began with land reforms, followed by increasing 
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1  Planning Commission: Indian Economy: Some Indicators (as on 1st June, 2011). 
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3  India’s Common People: Who are they, How many are they and How do they live, 
EPW March 15, 2008, Arjun Sen Gupta, KP Kannan, G Raveendran. 
4  Human Development report 2011: Sustainability and Equity A better Future for all. 
5  Report on Employment & Unemployment Survey (2009–10), GOI, Ministry of Labour 
& Unemployment, Labour Bureau, Chandigarh. 
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the area under irrigation, culminating in a dramatic rise in agricultural production 
through the introduction of high yielding varieties of wheat and rice, dubbed the 
“Green Revolution” of the late 1960s. But this only exacerbated inequalities be-
tween the large and the small farmers, the landed and the landless, and irrigated 
and rainfed regions. Thus, the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi launched a “di-
rect attack on poverty” in the mid 1970s, with large government funded programs 
of wage employment in public works and self-employment through credit-based 
asset acquisition. These two strategies have remained the main planks of poverty 
alleviation, with names changing from NREP to Food for Work to JRY to 
NREGA for wage-employment programs and from SFDA to IRDP to SGSY to 
NRLM for self-employment programs. 
The need to enhance agricultural production, and promote self-employment for 
the landless, led to the role of credit becoming significant. Banks were nationalized 
in 1969 and used throughout the 1970s and 1980s as instruments of development. 
But once again, it became clear that despite the priority sector lending obligation and 
the mandated credit for schemes for self-employment of the poor like the IRDP, 
banks did much less than what was needed. Then, in 1990s, with economic reforms 
redrawing the banks’ priorities in favour of sustainability, they turned their backs to 
the poor. It was left to NGOs to work out new modalities for providing the poor with 
access to credit6. This is what led to the emergence of the two predominant microfi-
nance models in the last two decades. In both, banks play the lenders’ role, but the 
front-end is tackled either by a “self-help group” (SHG) or by a microfinance institu-
tion (MFI).  
Access to credit has for ever been a major constraint for the poor in India. Tra-
ditionally the poor depended on large farmers, merchants and middlemen, pawn 
brokers and moneylenders for meeting their credit needs. Unable to pay high in-
terest rates, the poor often ended up forfeiting their land and eventually becoming 
bonded labourers to money lenders. Many attempts were made to break depend-
ence on money lenders through provision of institutional credit, starting from the 
British colonial period. The need to produce enough food to feed the growing 
population was a priority for the newly independent India. In the initial two dec-
ades 1947–67, cooperatives became less and less important as an answer to provi-
sion of credit for agriculture. In 1969, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi na-
tionalized the top ten banks and mandated them to open a large number of rural 
branches. Then in 1975, after money-lending was abolished during the Emer-
gency, the government set up a network of Regional Rural Banks to reach out to 
the rural poor, specifically small and marginal farmers, rural artisans and agricul-
tural labour. With a focus on physical expansion of banking services the branches 
grew rapidly during 1969 to 1990.  
                                                          
6  The others included building large scale infrastructure projects for irrigation and power, 
creating large scale extension network and promotion of modern agricultural practices, 
community development works, integrated development projects, area level develop-
ment projects based on specific geographies etc. 
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branch (in 1000s) 
Priority sector credit 
as % of total credit 
1969 1833 8262 64 14.0 
1980 15105 32419 21 33.0 
1990 31114 55410 14 43.8 
1995 33004 62367 15 33.7 
2000 32734 65412 15 35.4 
2010 32624 85393 13.8 35.1 
Source: Progress of Commercial Banking at a Glance – RBI Statistical Returns 
Though the last column in the table above looks impressive, the fact is that the so-
called priority sector includes many non-poor sectors, such as large farmers, 
commercial agriculture, small-scale industry, self-employed professionals and ex-
ports. The banking system had limited ability to reach the small borrowers as was 
evidenced by the fact that in 2004, only about 5 percent of bank credit went to 
small borrowers. 
1.1 Self Help Group – Bank Linkage Model – Achievements and 
Shortcomings 
In order to enhance access to credit to the poor, since the mid 1980s, NGOs started 
experimenting with credit groups. MYRADA, an NGO in Karnataka since 1986 
and PRADAN in Rajasthan since 1987, began setting up Self Help Groups 
(SHGs) for encouraging savings and credit and training on the principles of self 
help7. The German technical agency, then called GTZ, took many Indian officials 
from the Government of India (GoI), the Reserve bank of India (RBI) and the Na-
tional Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) to Indonesia to 
show them the possibilities of lending to the poor through groups. In 1992, the 
RBI approved a pilot project of linking SHGs to banks, which eventually led to 
the SHG-Bank linkage program (SBLP) in 1996. The SBLP received major policy 
and promotional support, both from the central and various state governments, in 
particular, Andhra Pradesh. It was scaled up nationwide through support from 
NABARD and World Bank loans8. By March 2011, around 7.46 million SHGs 
                                                          
7  Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Andhra Pradesh 2010: Global Implica-
tions of the Crisis in Indian Microfinance, 2010. 
8  Johnson, D. and Meka, S., Access to Finance in Andhra Pradesh, Institute for Financial 
Management and Research—Centre for Microfinance, 2010. 
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around India have been linked with banks in what is the world’s single largest mi-
crofinance program. About 4.78 million SHGs have loans outstanding worth INR 
312 billion9 (about Euro 4 billion). In the following year, 2011–12, banks dis-
bursed INR 84 billion in AP and INR 165 billion all over India, including AP.  
The direct benefit of the SBLP, in terms of income enhancement of poor 
households, and the indirect benefit in terms of women’s empowerment, has been 
enormous. Though a great leap forward in terms of enhancing credit access by the 
poor, the SHG model suffers from a major lacuna – it is subsidy driven, with at 
least three types of subsidies –  
First, is the cost of organizing the SHGs. In the early days, this was done by 
NGOs, a role increasingly taken over by government agencies as the scale went 
up. But both required subsidies. In AP, the funding largely came from World Bank 
loans of USD 600 million to the AP government run Society for Elimination of 
Rural Poverty (SERP).  
The second subsidy comes in the form of lower interest loan funds. While in 
the early years, banks lent to SHGs at 12 % per annum, successive state govern-
ments tried to subsidise the rate at which SHGs got funds. In AP it came down 
successively from 12 % in 1996 to 9 % before the 1999 state elections, to 3 % after 
the 2004 elections in which the SHGs were promised “paavla vaddi” (quarter per-
cent per month interest or 3 % pa). In 2011, the subsidy was increased to cover the 
full interest, so the cost of funds to SHGs has been reduced to 0 %10.  
The third subsidy is in the form of bad debts that banks have to write off. The 
recovery rates of SHGs in early years were 95 % plus and have steadily fallen as 
the poor sensed the program becoming one of political patronage. In the wake of 
the MFI Ordinance in AP, which led to mass default of MFI loans, initially SHG 
loan repayments increased but have in a year fallen to 60–70 %. The increasing 
subsidy has also led to increasing cornering of credit by the better-off members, 
corruption and reduction in repayment rates in expectation of loan waivers. 
1.2 Emergence of MFIs After Banking Sector Reforms Were Launched 
The introduction of financial sector reforms since 1992 saw a reduction in the 
share of small borrowers (below Rs. 25,000) to total bank credit decline from 
18.3 % in 1994 to 5.3 % in March 2002 and 1.3 % in March 2010. Even the num-
ber of small borrower accounts reduced from 55.8 million to 37.3 million in 
March 2002 to merely 1.9 million in March 201011. This is partly because most 
                                                          
9  National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), Status of Microfi-
nance in India, 2010–11, Mumbai. 
10 http://www.serp.ap.gov.in/AWFP/FrontServlet?requestType=BudgetLineReportRH& 
actionVal=Budgetline1&Year=20122013&FunctionalHead=-1&District=-1&Mandal=-1 
&CostCentre=-1.          
11  Mahajan, Vijay and Ramola, Bharti Gupta, Microfinance in India – Banyan Tree and 
Bonsai – A review paper for the World Bank, 2003. 
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small loans are now being given through SHGs or MFIs rather than directly by 
banks. After rising for three decades from 1951 onwards, the share of institutional 
credit to total credit declined during the period 1991 till 2001. It reduced from 
64 % to 57 % for rural areas. Over 70 % among the poorer households (less than 
Rs. 60,000 assets) were dependent on non-institutional sources for meeting their 
credit needs12.  
The need for physical collateral, high transaction costs involved in processing 
small amounts and concerns related to loan recovery discouraged banks from 
lending to small borrowers. This demanded an alternative system to meet their 
needs. The Grameen Bank, Bangladesh (GBB) demonstrated a successful model 
of microcredit steadily since 1976. Initially donor subsidised, the GBB model 
reached a volume where it could help meet the financial needs of the poor in a sus-
tainable manner. By the mid 1990s, the GGB model was being seen with great in-
terest by other countries.  
The then Finance Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh announced in 1995 
that India should have a bank for the poor like the GBB. Indian financial institu-
tions, led by NABARD, however, rejected the GBB model in favour of the home-
grown SHG model. Many Indian NGOs, however, experimented with both the 
models and found that using the GBB model, they could themselves become sus-
tainable. Once SIDBI and later private sector banks like the ICICI Bank started 
funding NGOs in a big way for microcredit, the GBB model was widely adopted 
by most Indian MFIs, with a few exceptions like BASIX. 
1.3 International Development Policy Thrust on Sustainability  
The success of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh led to demands for its replication 
all over the world and this was first done systematically at the Microcredit Summit 
in Washington DC in February, 1997. Thousands of organisations from develop-
ing countries joined the movement, and worked towards increasing outreach. Mi-
crocredit was also beginning to find favour among the donors such as the USAID, 
DfID of UK, Canadian CIDA, the German, the Dutch and the Scandinavian do-
nors and European donors all began to give substantial amount of funding to pro-
mote microfinance in developing countries. In India, apex lenders such as Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the Rashtriya Mahila Kosh 
(RMK) turn gave wholesale loans to MFIs, most of which began as developmental 
NGOs but quickly adopted the mantra of sustainability.  
The private sector arm of the World Bank, the International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC) and other development banks like the German KfW, the Dutch FMO 
and the British CDC all began to develop an interest in microfinance and began to 
invest in more commercially oriented MFIs, such as banks and non-bank finance 
                                                          
12  All India Debt and Investment Survey, 59th Round, National Sample Survey Organiza-
tion, December 2005. 
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companies. They also invested in a whole range of new funds, specializing in 
lending to and investing in the equity of microfinance institutions. These bodies, 
the earliest of which were set up in 2000, were called “microfinance investment 
vehicles” (MIVs) and there were as many as 150 MIVs listed on the Mix Market 
data base in 2012. Many of them raised funds from socially motivated investors 
who were willing to take a lower return if they saw their money helping the poor. 
By 2005, investors in microfinance had a motley mix of motivations, all way from 
those seeking no returns to those seeking high returns.  
The year 2005 was declared by the United Nations as the ‘International Year of 
Microcredit’ and the Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 was awarded to Prof Mohammed 
Yunus and the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Compartamos, a Mexican MFI 
which had begun as an NGO and transformed first to a non-bank credit company 
and then to a microfinance bank, made on Initial Public Offer and the IPO was 13 
times oversubscribed and considered a huge success by any financial market stan-
dards. This led to an upsurge of investment in MFIs and new classes of investors 
came in – those willing to take on structured debt obligations and private equity 
investors. They brought with them lots of expertise and funds, but also lots of ex-
pectations of high returns. They also spawned the ambitions of several MFI pro-
moters who realised they could make a lot of money by offering high growth rates 
and high profitability in their MFIs. 
2 Achievements and Shortcomings of MFIs in India 
The growth of MFIs was supported by state owned Small Industries Development 
Bank of India (SIDBI) and loans from commercial banks under the priority lend-
ing quotas since 2000. Initially they leant to NGO-MFIs but within a few years, as 
the amounts outstanding increased, they sought some equity as a risk cushion. 
This is when the larger NGO-MFIs began transforming into for-profit NBFCs. In 
the next step, by 2006, these NBFCs started attracting equity investments from 
specialized microfinance investment vehicles and private equity funds13. For ex-
ample, SHARE got equity from Legatum, Spandana from JM Financial and SKS 
from Sequoia, by 2007, within a few years of having been NGOs. By 2010 the 
MFI growth in India had reached its peak growing at 80 % per annum and the out-
reach had reached around 27 million.  
2.1 Achievements of MFIs 
MFIs could achieve what the banking sector could not achieve over the years. 
Within a short period of 15 years borrowers from MFIs increased from merely 
                                                          
13  Sparreboom, Pete, Indian Microfinance crisis, 2010, Working Group on inclusive fi-
nance in China, April 2011. 
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3,000 in 1995 to 31.7 million in 2010. In the corresponding period, the banking 
sector with its huge infrastructure only showed a decline in terms of lending to 
small borrowers14. MFIs brought down dependence on money lenders. MFIs offer 
a variety of loans for agriculture, animal husbandry and non-farm activities as well 
as for housing needs. MFIs introduced micro-insurance for life and health cover of 
borrowers, and some innovative ones also added weather insurance for crops and 
livestock insurance.  
In the run up to the SKS IPO in August 2010, a few MFIs participated in a 
reckless rush to build portfolio and the resultant multiple and higher ticket lending 
led to over-indebtedness in a small proportion of the borrowers. Many poor fami-
lies were overwhelmed by the repayment obligations. As they began to skip in-
stallments, MFI staff, accustomed to near 100 % on-time repayment, increased 
pressure on recoveries. Reports of coercive recoveries and in some cases, suicides 
by borrowers, began to appear in the media. This led to a political backlash and 
the AP state government enacted a law in October 2010 to curb MFIs.  
2.2 Shortcomings of MFIs 
Indian MFIs, particularly the four in AP – SKS, Spandana, SHARE and Asmitha – 
witnessed high levels of growth from 2006 onwards and could not manage that 
process well. A vast majority, with the exception of SEWA and BASIX, were fol-
lowing the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh model, offering a single product – a year-
long loan repayable in 50 equated weekly instalments. They recruited a large 
number of people, but did not train them or monitor them adequately. The only 
parameters to which the MFI managements and Boards seemed to pay attention to 
were growth in and health of the loan portfolio, and reduction in operating costs. 
The field staff quickly learnt to respond to that which was being monitored and 
incentivised and ignored all the rest, including, going to remote villages, searching 
for the really poor clients, handholding and training of client groups before giving 
them the powers to approve each other’s loans, and ensuring client education, or 
even adequate disclosure about interest rates and other terms.  
3 The Politics Behind the Microfinance Crisis in 
Andhra Pradesh 
The microfinance crisis in AP can be traced to the simultaneous expansion of 
SHG Bank Linkage Model promoted by the State and the MFI model by private 
players. By 2010, it was estimated that there were about 6.25 million MFI borrow-
                                                          
14  Figures derived from MIX Market Data. 
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ers in Andhra Pradesh and 19.11 million SHG Bank Linkage members15. Clearly, 
in percentage terms bank loans to MFIs had been growing faster than bank loans 
to SHGs. According to N. Srinivasan, in 2010 growth in MFI loans outstanding 
also overtook growth in SHG loans outstanding in absolute terms16. The growing 
pace of expansion of MFI meant that it could outpace SHG as a popular model for 
microfinance.  
This was not acceptable to the political class as they would lose hold over an 
important vote bank. The civil servants were in agreement with the political lead-
ers as they would lose hold of a major program and the related budget if MFIs oc-
cupied the dominant space. The hostility of the staff of the government sponsored 
Andhra Pradesh Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) towards MFIs is 
largely based on this anxiety. 
While the SHG movement was initially a grass root driven movement in An-
dhra Pradesh, it was sought to be co-opted by political parties. Since 1999, when 
the then incumbent Chief Minster Chandrababu Naidu of the Telugu Desam party 
(TDP), used women’s SHGs as his vote bank and returned to power, microfinance 
has become increasingly important to the electoral politics in Andhra Pradesh. Be-
ginning with the TDP, women’s SHGs were seen as a political constituency, a po-
tential vote bank17. Mr Naidu persuaded banks to lower interest rates on loans to 
women SHGs to 9 % from 12 % before the 1999 elections. The Congress, under 
the leadership of late YS Rajashekhar Reddy (YSR) sought to win the game of 
electoral politics during 2004 elections by offering to provide women loans at 3 % 
pa interest18, a promise which he kept on coming to power, with the Pavala Vaddi 
scheme19.  
In 2009 elections, the interest rates again became an issue of populist politics. 
TDP sought to win back the women vote base by agreeing to offer interest free 
loans upto a ceiling of Rs. 25,000 and 3 % loans for loans above Rs. 25,00020. 
However, in the face of the popularity of the YSR, Naidu could not make much 
impact. The recovery rates for bank lending to SHGs declined during the period. 
                                                          
15  Srinivasan, N., Microfinance India: State of the Sector 2010, Presentation to ACCESS 
Microfinance India Summit 2010. 
16  Srinivasan, N., Microfinance India: State of the Sector 2010, Presentation to ACCESS 
Microfinance India Summit 2010. 
17  http://telugudesam.org/cbn/velugu.html. 
18  Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee Manifesto 2004. 
19  G.O.Ms. No. 271, G.O.Rt.No.5, PR&RD (RD III) Department, Dated 17.09.2004. 
Pavala refers to quarter of a rupee i.e., quarter rupee interest per month which equals 
3 % interest per year. 
20  TDP Election Manifesto, 2009. 
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While recovery was over 95 % in 2007–08, by 2010–11 this had declined consid-
erably to a reported 60–70 %.21  
Unfortunately, YSR died in a helicopter crash within six months of getting re-
elected in 2009. His son Jagan Mohan Reddy was widely expected to become the 
Chief Minster, but the Congress High Command decided to appoint old loyalist 
Rosaiah. This led Jagan to rebel. He kept looking for issues to raise and the one 
about microfinance borrowers feeling so harassed that some committed suicides 
caught his attention. He found the perfect issue to embarrass Rosaiah and the High 
Command in Delhi – a picture of Rahul Gandhi sitting with Vikram Akula in a 
SKS women borrowers’ group meeting, which was carried in the media in 2006. 
There was also a photo of Smt Sonia Gandhi, the Congress party president, pre-
senting Akula with an award for Social Entrepreneur of the Year at the World 
Economic Forum’s India Economic Summit.22 Jagan’s newspaper Sakshi and his 
TV channel by the same name hammered the point – “Why would Rosaiah’s gov-
ernment act against MFIs, when the Gandhis are their friends?”. The other media 
picked up the issue. This led to acute embarrassment for the Congress and they 
even issued a denial but the charge stuck23.  
In October 2010, when media criticism against the MFIs was at its peak, the 
statements by leaders of political parties had its affect and the Congress govern-
ment in AP had to enact a harsh law curbing MFIs. The Government of Andhra 
Pradesh brought in the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of 
Money Lending) Ordinance, 201024 which was later passed as the Andhra Pradesh 
Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Bill 2011. This law had 
several features which effectively made it impossible for MFIs to function in the 
state. For example, MFI staff could not go to the residence or workplace of the 
borrower for recoveries, but instead had to go and sit at a central public place, 
hoping for borrowers to come and repay. No additional loans were permitted with-
out prior approval by the government.  
Though the law was ostensibly aimed to protect MFI borrowers from coercion 
and over-indebtedness, it virtually stopped MFIs from functioning in AP, Two 
crucial provisions were – visits by MFI staff to the residence or work place of the 
borrowers for recovery could be construed to be a coercive practice, so instead 
they had to sit in a “central place” hoping for borrowers to come there. Second, no 
further loans were allowed with government permission for each individual loan. 
This by itself slowed down recoveries drastically. But Opposition leaders, particu-
larly former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu, used this as an opportunity to 
                                                          




23  http://www.ysryouthcongress.in/2011/06/blog-post_23.html. 
24  G.O.M.S. 356, Panchayat Raj & Rural Development (RD-1), 19th October 2010. 
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win popularity by saying the law had not done enough and told people not to re-
pay MFI loans25. Similar statement was also made by Narayana of Communist 
Party of India26.  
This led to a mass default. Over 9.2 million loans worth Rs 72000 million 
(about USD 1.5 billion at that time) became overdue and 90 % remain unpaid till 
Apr 2012. Banks panicked and stopped lending to MFIs all over India and the out-
standings of the MFIs shrank by half. 
People took the convenient interpretation and stopped repaying MFI loans. In 
the aftermath of the AP MFI Act, 2011, the credit flow from banks to SHGs in AP 
also came down. This led the AP government to set up a special institution. Titled 
Sthree Nidhi27, this is an apex cooperative credit society that has been formed to 
provide interest free loans to women28. Using a high-tech platform, it disbursed Rs 
660 crore in loans to members of women’s SHGs. But this has had hardly any im-
pact on the overall credit availability as bank credit became tighter and money 
lenders continued to be the main source of funding at 5–10 % per month (60–120 % 
per annum) interest rate. Thus, in a last act of political desperation, to make itself 
look like the champion of the poor, the AP Government announced “vaddi leni 
runam” i.e., interest free loan29.  
4 Emerging Scenario – Responsible Finance  
The AP crisis led to several regulatory reforms and operational improvements. 
The larger MFOIs, which are NBFCs, formed as self-regulatory organisation – the 
Microfinance Institutions network (MFIN) and all of them joined the RBI ap-
proved credit bureaus, contributing over 70 million loan records and following a 
code of conduct, which prevented over and multiple lending. MFIN also system-
atically started interacting with political and administrative leaders to obviate cri-
ses before those arose. 
4.1 RBI Upgraded the Regulatory Framework for MFIs 
Following the AP Microfinance crises, the RBI appointed the Malegam Commit-
tee to study the MFI regulatory environment in India. The Malegam Committee 
after a consultative process with all stakeholders, including the Government of 
                                                          
25  http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dont-repay-microfinance-loans-tdp/706093/. 
26  http://www.siasat.com/english/news/cpi-leader-tells-mfi-borrowers-not-repay-loan. 
27  https://www.sthreenidhi.ap.gov.in. 
28  G.O.Ms.No. 285, PANCHAYAT RAJ & RURAL DEVELOPMENT (RD-II) DEPART-
MENT, Dated:26.08.2011. 
29  G.O.Ms.No. 403, PANCHAYAT RAJ & RURAL DEVELOPMENT (RD.II) DEPART-
MENT, Dated:26.12.2011. 
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India, select State Governments, major NBFCs working as MFIs, industry associa-
tions of MFIs working in the country, other smaller MFIs, and major banks etc., 
recommended (i) defining microfinance loans as up to Rs 50,000 per household, 
of which no more than 25 % could be for consumption purposes and placed an in-
come limit of the clients (Rs. 50,000 pa); (ii) imposed a margin cap and an interest 
rate cap on individual loans; (iii) transparency in interest charges; (iv) lending by 
not more than two MFIs to individual borrowers; (v) creation of one or more 
credit information bureaus; (vi) establishment of a proper system of grievance re-
dressal procedure by MFIs; (vii) creation of one or more “social capital funds”; 
and (viii) continuation of categorisation of bank loans to MFIs, complying with 
the regulation laid down for NBFC-MFIs, under the priority sector. The Commit-
tee also made a number of recommendations regarding MFI supervision, corporate 
governance etc.30 The RBI accepted the broad framework of regulations. Loans to 
MFIs will remain under the classification of priority sector lending provided they 
fulfil the Malegaon conditions. Besides a limit has been placed on the maximum 
income of the clients (Rs. 60,000 for rural and Rs. 1,20,000 for urban), size of in-
debtedness (not to exceed Rs. 50,000), extent of loan that can be used for con-
sumption (maximum 25 %), etc. The RBI also imposed both a cap on interest rate 
(max 26 %), as well on the net interest margin (12 %). The acceptance of the 
framework of Malegam Committee by the RBI provided much needed orderliness 
to the sector.  
4.2 Microfinance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill 2012 
The GoI introduced the Microfinance Institutions (Development and Regulation) 
Bill 2012 in the Parliament to further strengthen the regulatory framework in the 
microfinance industry. Drafted with extensive inputs from MFIs, SIDBI and 
NABARD, features of the Bill include: (i) defining microfinance broadly – be-
yond just lending, to include savings, insurance, money transfers, etc.; (ii) inclu-
sion of NBFC MFIs in its purview, in addition to NGO-MFIs; (iii) recognition of 
the RBI as the sole regulatory of NBFC MFIs and exclusion of MFIs from the 
purview of Money Lender Act; and (iv) Strengthened client protection norms – 
establishment of advisory councils at the central, state and district levels and re-
strictions on pricing and profitability; and an Ombudsman system. Greater insis-
tence of transparency in pricing and fees. 
                                                          
30  Ramesh S Arunachalam, http://microfinance-in-india.blogspot.in/2011/05/rbi-acceptance-
of-malegam-committee.html. 
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5 Conclusion 
The current phase of microfinance sector could be viewed as the beginning of a 
period of qualitative transformation. While the first phase (1996–2010) could be 
characterized as a period of rapid expansion of the MFI sector with a quantum 
jump in micro-lending to small borrowers, the current phase (2011– onwards) 
could be seen as a period of qualitative consolidation of the microfinance industry 
with the strengthening and increased clarity on regulatory framework and con-
sumer protection norms – in other words, the phase of “responsible finance”. 
While the first phase placed a larger emphasis on micro-credit, the second phase 
will expand the range of financial services offered by MFIs to also include thrift, in-
surance, pension services and money transfer. In the second phase, consumer protec-
tion norms are stronger. With Credit Information Bureaus having access to over 70 
million MFI loans, instances of multiple lending and over-indebtedness will reduce 
sharply. With the institution of Ombudsmen, the instances of misbehaviour with 
customers and coercive recovery practices are bound to get minimised. The high 
growth, high profit regime prevailing from 2006–10 has been curbed by the RBI 
capping interest margins on the one hand, and the banks squeezing the extent of 
credit they give to MFIs. Even the investor mania is long since over after the SKS 
shares plunged from a high of INR 1400 to a low of Rs 60. But more sober investors 
are coming back and investing in more solidly run MFIs. 
The AP crisis was not caused either by the reckless actions of a few MFI pro-
moters not by over-zealous bureaucrats out to protect SHG women from coercion. 
It was the failure of the complete eco-system – from the rich investor in Europe to 
the poor borrowers in AP villages. All played their part in the unfolding of this 
tragedy. The investors saw microfinance as a way of doing good while doing well, 
expecting high returns when this was unrealistic. The MFI promoters, CEOs and 
managements, desperate for capital to grow, fell in line to fulfil these expectations. 
Banks fuelled this growth with a lot of leveraged loan funds, as they found this to 
be an easy way to meet their priority sector lending obligation, with a high margin. 
MFI field staff were incentivised to lend more and recover tightly. Borrowers 
could not resist the temptation of easy loans till they realised that repaying one 
loan by taking another gets them into more and more indebtedness. The regulator, 
RBI, followed a policy of benign neglect. 
But there is still a lot to be learnt by all these stakeholders. MFIs have to learn 
that they cannot deal with the poor – the vote bank of the politicians – on just their 
own terms. Banks have to learn that they will never be able to reach the poor as effi-
ciently as dedicated MFIs and so they must support this channel instead of setting up 
their own mimic channels. Multilaterals like the World Bank have to learn that they 
cannot help the poor by providing funding which is used by politicians to subsidise 
interest rates to unsustainable levels. Its investment arm, the IFC and other investors 
must learn to curb their expectations of returns or seek those elsewhere. Most impor-
tantly, politicians have to learn the simple principle that they cannot drive down the 
price (interest rate) of a commodity and yet expect its supply to go up.  
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